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A war for liberty
On the law of conscientious objection
j e r emy k . k e s s l er
Introduction
One common understanding of the Second World War is that it was a
contest between liberty and tyranny. For many at the time – and for still
more today – ‘liberty’ meant the rule of law: government constrained by
principle, procedure, and most of all, individual rights. For those states that
claimed to represent this rule-of-law tradition, total war presented enormous
challenges, even outright contradictions. How would these states manage to
square the governmental imperatives of military emergency with the legal
protections and procedures essential to preserving the ancient ‘liberty of the
subject’? This question could be and was asked with regard to many areas of
law. The traditional order of property rights, for instance, was already in
disarray thanks to the shocks of monopoly capitalism, labour militancy, the
First World War, and the profound crisis of the Great Depression. Yet few
rights would more directly test a wartime government’s conception of the
rule of law than the right of conscientious objection. The refusal of alleged
pacifists to participate in the often lawless violence of the Second World War
posed fundamental practical and normative challenges for all combatants –
but especially for those who understood themselves to be fighting for
individual liberty.
Of course, conscientious objection did not emerge as a problem for liberal
governance in 1939. New governmental efforts to regulate civilian and
military manpower in the late nineteenth century first raised the possibility –
even the necessity – of accommodating individuals on the basis of their moral
and religious beliefs. And the First World War saw the institution of the first
formal systems of military conscientious objection. During the interwar
period, however, the virtue of maintaining, let alone extending, such indi-
vidual rights protection was cast into doubt. By the early 1930s, for instance,
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Hitler and Stalin had parted ways with any liberal notion of legal culture, and
launched breakneck programmes of centralization and collectivization. As a
consequence, Russian and German pacifists would fare far worse in the
Second World War than they had in the First World War, when their
treatment was not so different from that of pacifists in the Entente. But even
within the liberal nations, most interwar leaders felt that a radical transform-
ation of the rule of law was necessary to create more secure and just
democratic societies. By studying the development of the law of conscien-
tious objection from the First World War through the Second World War,
we can track both the growing separation between liberal and totalitarian
governance and the internal crisis that wracked liberalism in these years.
During the Second World War, all of the major belligerents fought with
conscript armies, but only a few created a formal legal process to accommo-
date pacifist citizens swept up in the draft – Great Britain, some of its
Dominions, and the USA. Historians and legal scholars generally attribute
the exceptional character of American, British and Commonwealth conscien-
tious objector policy to long-term patterns in Anglo-American legal and
political development.1 These scholars emphasize a shared encounter with
religious pluralism, a shared tradition of military voluntarism, and above all,
a shared commitment to individual rights against state interference. Such
explanations from the persistence of classical liberalism fit neatly within
the ideology of the Anglo-American war effort itself, an ideology that framed
the war as a struggle ‘to establish, on impregnable rocks, the rights of
the individual’2 and to preserve ‘that conception of liberty . . . which we
have all inherited’.3But this contrast between totalitarian lawlessness and
the traditional liberties preserved by the Western powers is too static: the
‘conception of liberty’ for which the Anglo-Americans fought was in a state
of flux during the 1930s and 1940s.
1 See, for example, Martin Ceadal, Pacifism in Britain, 1914–1945: The Defining of a Faith
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); George Flynn, Conscription and Democracy: The Draft in
France, Great Britain, and the United States (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002),
189–206; Edward P. Cain, ‘Conscientious Objection in France, Britain and the United
States’, Comparative Politics 2:2 (1970), 275–307; John Whiteclay Chambers II, ‘Conscien-
tious Objectors and the American State from Colonial Times to the Present’, in Charles
Moskos and John Whiteclay Chambers II, eds., The New Conscientious Objection: From
Sacred to Secular Resistance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 23–47.
2 Winston Churchill, ‘War Speech’, 3 September 1939, in Winston S. Churchill: His
Complete Speeches, 1897–1963, ed. Robert Rhodes James (New York: Bowker, 1974 vol.
vi, at xxx.
3 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation 2425, Selective Service Registration,
16 September 1940 (www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15858).
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The Second World War did not so much interrupt as continue by other
means a decades-long, transatlantic debate about the proper relationship
between personal liberty and state power. For many – perhaps most –
participants in the debate, the task at hand was to shuck off traditional
conceptions of liberty as much as to preserve them, to forge a third way
between classical liberalism and the totalitarian alternatives. For dogged
defenders of the old liberal line, the choice remained stark. Conscription –
and the treatment of those who opposed it – became one important site for
this larger contest. The law of conscientious objection developed by the
Anglo-American combatants reflected less the liberal inheritance for which
they claimed to fight than their ongoing search for novel forms of govern-
ance, a search that would continue in the post-war years.
This chapter describes the American, British and Commonwealth
approaches to conscientious objection during the Second World War and
contrasts them with how other belligerents treated those who refused to
fight. In doing so, it reveals unexpected similarities between Anglo-American
and alternative approaches, and important differences within the Anglo-
American world. Taken together, these comparisons and contrasts situate
Second World War conscientious objection within a larger legal struggle
over the structure and limits of state power. This legal struggle shaped how
the war was fought, even as its final resolution depended on the outcome
of the war itself.
Conscientious objection before the Second World War
The problem of conscientious objection was first recognized by modern
states in the last third of the nineteenth century. In the thirty years following
the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussian model of universal military training
and service swept the globe. Earlier forms of conscription had included broad
regional, socio-economic, and sectarian carve-outs: urban populations, for
instance, were often exempted; the wealthy could almost always buy their
way out; and provisions were at times made for historically recognized
pacifist religious sects. The Prussian model, on other hand, was aimed at
militarizing a far greater proportion of the population. This development in
military affairs accompanied a more general expansion of state capacity, as
governments around the world struggled to contour and control the indus-
trial revolution and global integration. In response, dissident social groups
sought at times to restrain, at times to commandeer the increasingly power-
ful and pervasive military and administrative apparatus of the modern state.
On the law of conscientious objection
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The legal practice of conscientious objection – by which individuals seek
to prove the sincerity of their non-violent convictions to government officials
and thereby receive some form of individualized accommodation – emerged
from this struggle over growing administrative power. Yet even as adminis-
trative power was itself a source of concern for anti-militarists, the practice of
conscientious objection tended to take on administrative form, as executive
officials – rather than courts – became responsible for adjudicating the
sincerity of the individual conscience. This approach to the problem of
conscience accompanied a more general turn to administrative decision-
making in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as an increas-
ingly interconnected world demanded expert, adaptive management of
workers, owners, immigrants and soldiers.
The phrase ‘conscientious objection’ actually entered the English language
in the 1850s, when a movement arose in England to oppose novel legislation
mandating compulsory smallpox vaccination of children.4 Eventually, the
British Parliament responded to this campaign, instituting a system of ‘con-
scientious objection’ with the Vaccination Act of 1898. The Act’s conscience
clause required parents to satisfy a justice of the peace that they ‘conscien-
tiously believe[d] that vaccination would be prejudicial to the health of the
child’.5 Many anti-vaccinationists and their Liberal supporters in Parliament
objected to this juridical procedure, arguing that conscience could simply not
be judged.6 They got their way in 1907 when the new Liberal government
passed an Act allowing for a simple declaration of conscientious objection,
without further judicial or administrative inquiry. The rate of objection
nearly doubled after the passage of the Act.
Contemporaneously with Britain’s smallpox regime, a few countries
implemented formal protections for the individual conscience within their
military manpower systems. The first to do so was Norway. In response to
a peace movement backed by Quakers and socialists, the Norwegian Depart-
ment of Defence issued a series of administrative orders between
1900 and 1902, first recommending that conscientious objectors be assigned
to non-combatant duty and then exempting all sincere religious pacifists from
4 Nadja Durbach, Bodily Matters: The Anti-Vaccination Movement in England, 1853–1907
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 172–3; cf. Michel Foucault, Security,
Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978, ed. Michel Senellart, trans.
Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 85–91.
5 Durbach, Bodily Matters, p. 180.
6 John Rae, Conscience and Politics: The British Government and the Conscientious Objector to
Military Service, 1916–1919 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 43–4.
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the draft.7 A year later, the Australian Defence Act – which made all male
citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 liable for compulsory service in time of
‘emergency’ – directed administrators to design procedures to accommodate
religious pacifists in the event of conscription.8 When compulsory military
training was finally introduced in 1910, the procedures were as follows: if a
man could prove the sincerity of his objections to war – whether religious or
non-religious – in a common law court, he would then be entitled to non-
combatant duties, generally in the armed forces. In New Zealand, which
also established compulsory military training in 1910, military authorities
rather than courts were left to make the determination of sincerity, and only
religious objectors were recognized as legitimate.9 In Australia and New
Zealand, as in Norway, a coalition of religious and secular, socialist peace
activists extracted these concessions to the anti-war conscience.
When the debate over military conscription came to Britain in 1916,
Parliament adopted the language of ‘conscientious objection’ from the anti-
vaccination context. It did not, however, adopt either the 1907 or the 1898
models for accommodating the anti-vaccination conscience, or the Australian
model for dealing with military training objectors. Neither a simple affirm-
ation nor appearance in a common law court sufficed to secure conscientious
objector status. Instead, alleged conscientious objectors had to prove their
sincerity before administrative tribunals established to determine each and
every registrant’s draft status.10 During the First World War, the USA,
Canada and New Zealand similarly assigned the task of determining the
sincerity of objectors to administrative decision-making bodies. Australia
would remain the exception in both the First and the Second World Wars,
leaving this determination to common law courts. Elsewhere, expanding
administrative states would both pose the primary threat to conscience and
provide the primary arena for its accommodation.
While Denmark remained neutral during the First World War, it did
mobilize its citizenry and – in response to forceful opposition from the
Danish Socialist Party – passed a law providing for conscientious objection
7 Peter Brock, Against the Draft: Essays on Conscientious Objection from the Radical Refor-
mation to the Second World War (University of Toronto Press, 2006), pp. 133–4.
8 Hugh Smith, ‘Conscience, Law and the State: Australia’s Approach to Conscientious
Objection Since 1901’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 35 (1989), 13–28 (p. 15).
9 R. L. Weitzel, ‘Pacifists and Anti-Militarists in New Zealand, 1909–1914’, New Zealand
Journal of History 7:2 (1973), 123–47 (pp. 136–7).
10 James McDermott, British Military Service Tribunals, 1916–1918 (Manchester University
Press, 2011), pp. 36–58.
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in 1917.11 Mirroring the majority approach in Anglo-American nations, this
law delegated the details of accommodation to administrators. Neutral
Holland also mobilized during the First World War and, in response to draft
resistance and lobbying from ‘progressive clergy’, implemented a system
of conscientious objection in November 1917.12 Whereas Denmark first
established a right of conscientious objection by legislative act, conscientious
objection in the Netherlands, as in Norway, was initially a matter of purely
administrative regulation. The minister of war convened a ‘secret advisory
commission’ to which draftees could appeal for conscientious objection
recognition; if the commission found a man sincere, he would be assigned
to non-combatant duty in the military.
Across the rest of the Continent during the First World War, the ability of
pacifists to avoid punishment for refusing to fight depended on long-standing
customs and informal practices. These norms and practices generally applied
only to members of certain well-pedigreed pacifist religious sects; secular and
heterodox pacifists were out of luck. In Russia, for instance, a host of non-
violent Christian groups – including ‘the Molokans, Dukhobors, Baptists,
Evangelical Christians, Mennonites, and Tolstoians’ – met the universaliza-
tion of conscription in 1874 with protest.13 But only the Mennonites –
exempted from military service since their immigration under Catherine
the Great – received formal accommodation. Other sectarians who refused
to serve were tried by military courts and suffered incarceration and torture.
The number of objectors and the severity of punishments both increased
dramatically during the First World War. As will be discussed below, the
situation changed dramatically after the Bolsheviks seized power.
Germany tended to be more accommodating than Imperial Russia, though
mostly through informal means. Following the introduction of universal
military service in 1867, Mennonite conscripts were permitted, ‘if they so
wished, to serve in the army in noncombatant capacity’.14 While most
Mennonites gave up their pacifist commitments in response to national
emergency, about a third of the West Prussian Mennonites requested and
received non-combatant duties during the First World War. Army officers
11 Henning Sørensen, ‘Denmark: The Vanguard of Conscientious Objection’, in Moskos
and Chambers, eds., The New Conscientious Objection, pp. 106–13 (pp. 106–7).
12 J. G. van de Vijver, ‘Appendix E: The Netherlands’, in Moskos and Chambers, eds.,
The New Conscientious Objection, pp. 220–5 (p. 221).
13 Joshua A. Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and
Mass Politics, 1905–1925 (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003), pp. 183–4.
14 Brock, Against the Draft, p. 282.
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arrived at similar arrangements with Bible Students (Jehovah’s Witnesses)
and Seventh-Day Adventists, most of whom served in the medical corps. The
military code made clear the informality of these accommodations, explicitly
rejecting religious conscience as a legitimate ground of disobedience. Those
men who refused orders to perform either non-combatant or combatant
duty on conscientious grounds were, however, usually sent to psychiatric
clinics for medical rather than military discipline.
In France, there is no record of even informal accommodation of pacifists
during the First World War. Would-be conscientious objectors ‘were treated
as common deserters and given harsh sentences’, generally one year in
prison – with or without hard labour – for a first refusal to serve, followed
by two-year stints after each subsequent refusal.15 Scholars have attributed
this refusal to accommodate even the religious pacifist at times to the cultural
dominance of just-war Catholicism, at times to the cultural dominance of
republicanism or civic nationalism.16 Both of these explanations are, how-
ever, troubled by the fact that between 1793 and 1815, ‘all citizens whose
denomination and moral beliefs forbid the bearing of arms’ were able either
to pay their way out of service or request non-combatant duty.17 In any
event, France may well have been the least accommodating of all belligerent
nations during the First World War.
As this brief survey of First World War practice shows, accommodation
of the anti-war conscience was – with the sole exception of Australia –
managed by administrative decision-makers. National practices differed
in four major respects: the range of anti-war beliefs accommodated; the
range of accommodations offered; the civilian or military character of the
decision-making process; and the formality of the decision-making process.
German and Russian practices involved a relatively informal, military-run
administrative process that recognized a narrower range of sectarian
reasons for objecting. Anglo-American and Danish practices involved a
relatively formalized, civilian-run administrative process that recognized a
wider range of religious – and in some cases secular – reasons for objecting
to combat service.
15 Michel L. Martin, ‘France: A Statute but No Objectors,’ in Moskos and Chambers, eds.,
The New Conscientious Objection, pp. 80–97 (p. 83).
16 See, for example, Margaret Levi, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism (Cambridge University
Press, 1997), pp. 185–6.
17 Flynn, Conscription and Democracy, pp. 200–1; Michel Martin, Warriors to Managers: The
French Military Establishment since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1981), p. 167 n. 28.
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Even in more accommodating countries, however, advocates for conscien-
tious objectors argued that the administrative process was far too severe.
In the USA, for instance, a new generation of civil libertarians assailed as
tyrannical the administrative resolution of conscience claims.18 Similar dissat-
isfaction with the administration of conscientious objection arose in Britain,
where military service tribunals became an exemplary case of the danger of
having administrators adjudicate individual rights.19 In general, the debate
over conscientious objection during the First World War foregrounded a
larger debate about the increasing power administrators wielded over indi-
vidual citizens in modern nation states, and about the relative independence
of those administrators from judicial and legislative oversight. Although this
debate had been well under way before the war, the unavoidable primacy
of executive decision-making in wartime kicked it into a higher gear.20
The interwar debate over administrative governance
In the aftermath of the First World War, Britain and the USA dismantled
most of their draft apparatus and many other wartime agencies. Yet their
administrative states continued to grow in the 1920s, rapidly expanding
during the 1930s in response to economic crisis. This growth occasioned a
heated debate over the legitimacy of administrative governance – policy-
making and adjudication by executive officials rather than legislatures and
courts. While anxiety about administrative governance was particularly acute
in Britain and the USA, ‘[e]ven in countries with well-established bureau-
cratic traditions, the emergence of the welfare state entailed a significant
diffusion of normative power away from elected legislatures into an often
fragmented and complex executive and administrative sphere’.21 This section
focuses on the Anglo-American debate, as it was mainly in this context that
conscientious objection found a legitimate home during the Second World
War. Nevertheless, continental developments – particularly the nightmarish
18 See, for example, John Nevin Sayre, ‘Political Prisoners in America’, The Dial (28
December 1918), 623–4.
19 See, for example, Robert S. W. Pollard, Conscience and Liberty (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1940).
20 Daniel Ernst, ‘Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter and the American Rechtsstaat:
A Transatlantic Shipwreck, 1894–1932’, Studies in American Political Development 23
(October 2009), 171–88 (p. 174).
21 Peter L. Lindseth, ‘The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy,
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picture of administrative governance that rose from the ruins of Weimar –
would haunt the Anglo-American debate and the administration of conscien-
tious objectors that it produced. Across the globe, administrative governance
provided the framework within which the Second World War belligerents
would sustain, transform or abandon the legal protection of individual
liberty.
At the heart of the interwar debate over administrative governance were
three interrelated questions about the proper relationship between agencies,
courts and legislatures. The first question was to what extent administrative
agencies should make policy. The classic nineteenth-century understanding
of the function of administrators was to execute policies designed by legisla-
tures, not to design their own. But in the early twentieth century, as social
and economic conflict intensified, legislatures became increasingly keen to
delegate policy-making authority to administrative experts. And even in the
absence of such explicit delegation, the line between making and simply
implementing policy tended to blur, worrying those committed to a classical
liberal conception of the separation of powers.22
The second question also concerned a blurring of the separation of
powers – the increasing use of administrative bodies to adjudicate disputes
involving individual rights. Here, it seemed, the legislature and executive
were usurping the authority of common law courts, while imposing a mode
of adjudication stripped of traditional procedural protections.
Finally, the third question concerned the extent to which common law
courts could review administrative decisions. This question tended to piggy-
back on the first two, because judicial review, if available, might obviate
many of the dangers of administrative policy-making and adjudication.
If, on the other hand, the administrative state continued to take on
legislative and judicial functions while escaping judicial review, a ‘New
Despotism’ would be at hand – or so argued an influential 1929 manifesto
22 There was one basic difference between British and American anxieties about the
erosion of the separation of powers. In the USA, legislative delegation of policy-
making or adjudicative power to the executive branch was considered presumptively
unconstitutional, the legislature, executive and judiciary being co-equal branches of
government. In English law, on the other hand, there was no strictly ‘constitutional
impediment to the delegation of legislative and judicial powers to the Executive’,
given ‘the legal omnipotence of the King in Parliament’. Nonetheless, such delegations
were seen as undermining prudential and customary norms. See Stanley A. de Smith,
‘Delegated Legislation in England’, Western Political Quarterly 2:4 (1949), 514–26;
Michael Taggert, ‘From “Parliamentary Powers” to Privatization: The Chequered
History of Delegated Legislation in the Twentieth Century’, University of Toronto
Law Journal 55:3 (2005), 575–627 (pp. 595–6).
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written by the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Hewart.23 The goal of the
new despots of the civil service, according to Lord Hewart, was ‘to subordin-
ate Parliament, to evade the Courts, and to render the will, or the caprice,
of the Executive unfettered and supreme’.24 At stake was not just the place of
judicial and legislative bodies in the constitutional order, but their practical
ability to check the executive’s disregard for individual rights.
Critics of administrative governance on both sides of the Atlantic trum-
peted the warnings of Lord Hewart, but he also had many detractors. One of
the most important American opponents of the Hewart line happened to be
the man who had written the blueprint for the USA’s system of conscientious
objection during the First World War – Felix Frankfurter. As an assistant in
Woodrow Wilson’s War Department, Frankfurter sketched the centralized
administrative process that the government used to accommodate a wide
range of anti-war belief within the draft apparatus.25 This system exhibited
many of the features of administrative governance considered so problematic
by critics – policy-making powers unrestrained by legislative guidance,
informal adjudicatory procedure, limited judicial review. During the inter-
war period, Frankfurter would play a key role in extending these features
of administrative governance to other areas of the American state.
Frankfurter and his allies objected to the conventional mode of evaluating
administrative action, which asked ‘whether private interests [were]
adequately safeguarded’ by a given administrative scheme.26 For them, the
task of administration was the expert balancing of private and public inter-
ests, not the sacrifice of the former to the latter: ‘we can’t consider whether
private interests are safeguarded without equally considering the public
interests that are asserted against them.’27 As Frankfurter put it in a landmark
1927 article, the ultimate task of administrative law was to ‘fashion . . .
instruments and processes at once adequate for social needs and the protec-
tion of individual freedom’.28 If the priority of the classical view was the
‘constraint of administrative discretion, Frankfurter thought it was the free-
ing of administrators from the oversight of common-law courts’.29
23 Lord Hewart of Bury, The New Despotism (London: Ernest Benn, 1929).
24 Ibid., p. 17.
25 Jeremy K. Kessler, ‘The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law’,
Columbia Law Review 114 (June 2014).
26 Ernst, ‘American Rechtsstaat’, p. 180.
27 Ibid. (quoting Frankfurter).
28 Felix Frankfurter, ‘The Task of Administrative Law’, University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 75 (1927), 614–21 (p. 617).
29 Ernst, ‘American Rechtsstaat’, p. 173.
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Frankfurter was not blind to the risk of abuse, even constitutional abuse,
from unchecked administrators. But, he argued, such risk did not merit the
imposition of legalistic constraints by courts of law: ‘[u]ltimate protection’
against constitutional abuses by administrators was ‘to be found in the people
themselves, their zeal for liberty, their respect for one another and for the
common good’.30 In addition to this external, political check, he also recom-
mended internal, administrative safeguards: ‘a highly professionalized civil
service, an adequate technique of administrative application of legal stand-
ards, a flexible, appropriate and economical procedure . . . easy access to
public scrutiny, and a constant play of criticism by an informed and spirited
bar’.31 This vision of a democratic and professional civil service free from
judicial second-guessing inspired the generation of bureaucrats that built and
manned the American state during the New Deal and the Second
World War.
Frankfurter’s influence also extended across the Atlantic. It was under
his supervision that the legal scholar John Willis wrote the leading English
response to Lord Hewart’s assault on administrative governance – The
Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments.32 At the heart
of the book was a workmanlike review of English legal history, demon-
strating that the parliamentary delegation of ‘“extraordinary” powers’ to
administrative officials had a long pedigree – a point that no less an
authority than F. W. Maitland had made fifty years earlier.33 Those like
Lord Hewart who sought to instigate a moral panic over the ‘new despot-
ism’ were engaged, Willis contended, in politically motivated scare-
mongering; they sought not to save the rule of law but to use a cramped
interpretation of it to derail social and economic reform. In applying
doctrines such as the ‘strict interpretation’ of statutes and the ‘presumption
in favour of the liberty of the subject’, judges were simply imposing their
‘personal preferences’, preferences hostile to the egalitarian work of the
bureaucracy.34
30 Frankfurter, ‘Task of Administrative Law’, p. 618.
31 Ibid.
32 John Willis, The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933); see also Taggert, ‘From “Parliamentary
Powers” to Privatization’, pp. 581–2.
33 Taggert, ‘From “Parliamentary Powers” to Privatization’, pp. 585–6; see also Peter
Lindseth, ‘Reconciling with the Past: John Willis and the Question of Judicial Review in
Interwar and Postwar England’, University of Toronto Law Journal 55 (2005), 657–89
(p. 664).
34 Willis, Parliamentary Powers, pp. 51, 80.
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In an era in which some of the sharpest legal minds in Germany dedicated
themselves to overthrowing the Weimar Republic and Stalin launched his
collectivization drive and staged his show trials, Anglo-American debates
about judicial review of administrative decision-making may look like a side-
show. But these debates were themselves occasioned by the same rolling
political and economic crisis that toppled Weimar and entrenched Stalin’s
rule. How would liberal democracy survive in this world of class conflict,
ethnic violence and ‘Leviathan-states’?35 For defenders of the classical inter-
pretation of liberal democracy, the only hope was the preservation of an
independent judiciary capable of preventing a tyrannical executive from
suppressing both individual freedom and parliamentary decision-making.
For the new guard, led by the likes of Frankfurter and Willis, the survival
of both individual and parliamentary autonomy depended on the ability of
expert administrators to solve social and economic problems.
While in Britain, the Liberal and Labour partisans of government inter-
vention lost control of Parliament in 1931, the Democratic Party’s electoral
victories in 1932 and 1936 marked the closest the USA ever came to a labour
government, dedicated to public regulation in the interest of the working
man. This New Deal regime went on to create vast new administrative
bodies, including the National Industrial Recovery Administration and the
National Labor Relations Board, agencies empowered to manage the grow-
ing struggle between labour and capital and the inefficiencies of market
competition. By standing in the way of these efforts, courts only escalated
the social and economic crisis that threatened to overwhelm all branches of
government – or so the advocates of administrative governance argued.
On the other side, critics of the New Deal assailed the administrative state’s
expanding control of economy and society as a surrender to – rather than a
stopgap against – totalitarian rule.
Frustrated by the courts’ continuing resistance to New Deal administra-
tion, President Roosevelt used the momentum of his landslide re-election
in 1936 to try to end the logjam once and for all. During the campaign,
Roosevelt had characterized his political opponents as ‘economic royalists’
and the courts as the seat of oligarchy.36 Flush with victory in the early
35 The term l’état-Leviathan was French jurist René Cassin’s. See Jay Winter and Antoine
Prost, René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Universal Declaration
(Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 84–5.
36 Jared A. Goldstein, ‘The American Liberty League and the Rise of Constitutional
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months of 1937, the President announced his plan to pack the Supreme
Court – to force the retirement of some Justices and to expand the number
of Justices he himself could appoint. He also pushed for an executive
reorganization plan that would heighten presidential control over the admin-
istrative state. Although intended to marginalize New Deal critics, these
initiatives actually gave new ammunition to the partisans of judicial review
and a more restrained administrative state.
In the context of the Nazi government’s escalating domestic and inter-
national aggression, the American President’s efforts to consolidate power
were especially vulnerable to charges of ‘administrative absolutism’.37 Many
lawyers, including many former supporters, saw Roosevelt’s move against
the Supreme Court as an assault on the very foundations of the rule of law.
Indeed, one of the leading opponents of court-packing, the New York
corporate lawyer Grenville Clark, had voted for Roosevelt twice and sup-
ported many aspects of the New Deal. But in response to Roosevelt’s attack
on judicial autonomy, Clark launched a campaign to recover the prestige of
the courts. Central to this campaign was his identification of judicial review
with the protection of non-economic individual rights – civil liberties or
‘personal rights’.38
While earlier British and American critics had focused on the threat that
administrative governance posed to property rights, Clark and his ideological
allies developed a new language that drew morally charged parallels between
fascist and communist oppression of ethnic and religious minorities abroad
and big government at home. They framed their challenge to the New Deal
state as a defence of the rights of freedom of speech and religion, the rights
of minorities, and the right to a fair trial. This framing enabled Clark and
his elite legal allies at the American Bar Association (ABA) to co-opt a set
of issues that had long been the concern of left-wing groups such as the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). But whereas these groups had
often welcomed New Deal administrators as effective enforcers of the
rights of minorities and dissenters against the tyranny of wealthy interests
37 Annual Report of the American Bar Association 63 (1938), 331–68 (p. 343).
38 For the following discussion of Clark’s advocacy, see Gerald T. Dunne, Grenville Clark:
Public Citizen (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986); Jeremy K. Kessler, ‘First
Amendment Challenges to Economic Regulation in the Jehovah’s Witness Cases’
(paper presented at Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference, Yale Law School,
4 May 2014); Laura Weinrib, ‘The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor, and the
Limits of State Power, 1917–1940’ (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, May 2011),
pp. 412–29.
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and jingoistic mobs, Clark and the ABA identified the courts as the bul-
wark of civil libertarianism.
Felix Frankfurter, himself a co-founder of the ACLU, was left to insist
that Clark’s ‘view of the Supreme Court, as the great safe-guard of those
democratic institutions that you and I so passionately care about, is much
too romantic and too simplified’.39 For Frankfurter, the first decades of the
twentieth century had shown that the best checks on administrative decision-
making were democratic politics and professional expertise, not the courts.
Frankfurter himself had helped to design an administrative system protecting
the rights of conscience during the last war. Unsurprisingly then, when
Roosevelt appointed him to the Supreme Court in 1939, Frankfurter
attempted to hold the line against the new vogue for judicial supremacy in
the name of civil liberty. At that moment, however, the outbreak of the war
in Europe reframed this domestic struggle over the American legal order.
One of the first cases that Grenville Clark and his newly formed Bill of
Rights Committee championed involved the refusal of Jehovah’s Witness
children to participate in public-school flag salute ceremonies. In 1935, the
Witnesses had begun to object to these ceremonies in response to the
suffering of their German brethren, who were being imprisoned and shot
for refusing to salute the Führer and to serve in the recently reinstituted
system of German conscription.40 Insensitive to this dynamic, American
public schools began expelling recalcitrant Witness children. By the time
the dispute reached the Supreme Court in 1940, Europe was in flames.
Indeed, Felix Frankfurter’s majority opinion in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis41 became known as ‘Felix’s Fall of France opinion’, as the Justice
wrote it while the Wehrmacht marched through Paris.42 In it, Frankfurter
reasoned that legislators and administrators were best suited to resolve the
‘clash of rights’ that arose between democratic majorities and dissenters, and
that in such a time of international crisis, it was reasonable for political
39 Felix Frankfurter to Grenville Clark (1 July 1937), Grenville Clark Papers, Series VI,
Box 1, Dartmouth College.
40 Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of
the Rights Revolution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), pp. 24–8; Peter
Brock, ‘Conscientious Objectors in Nazi Germany’, in Peter Brock and Thomas P.
Socknat, eds., Challenge to Mars: Essays on Pacifism from 1918 to 1945 (University of
Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 370–9 (pp. 370–1).
41 310 US 586 (1940).
42 Mary Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford University
Press, 2012), p. 59.
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decision-makers to value national solidarity over individual difference.43
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, the lone dissenter in the case, Grenville Clark,
and much of the legal press reached the opposite conclusion. As Nazi tyranny
ran wild, they argued, it was all the more important to maintain – even
expand – Anglo-American traditions of civil liberty and judicial power.
As this example suggests, the onset of war in Europe intensified the debate
over administrative governance and its relationship to individual liberty.
But war also scrambled that debate’s battle-lines. While Gobitis appeared
to pit partisans of political autonomy and state power against partisans
of judicial review and civil liberties, many of those who celebrated the
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ cause also wholeheartedly supported a contemporan-
eous push for peacetime conscription – an expansion of state control unpre-
cedented in the nation’s history. Indeed, at the same moment that he assailed
the power of school boards to compel Witnesses to salute the flag, Grenville
Clark was working with Felix Frankfurter to convince President Roosevelt
to support a new draft law. And in writing that law, Clark would make sure
to insulate the draft apparatus from judicial review.44
Just as earlier civil libertarians had argued that administrative agencies
were often themselves the fairest and most efficient defenders of individual
freedom, Clark saw the peacetime draft as a civil libertarian institution,
uniquely capable of fairly and efficiently managing the manpower necessary
to oppose totalitarianism. His preamble to the Selective Training and Service
bill stressed both the libertarian and egalitarian character of the draft,
explaining that its purpose was ‘to insure the independence and freedom
of the people of the United States’, and that ‘in a free society it is just and
right that the obligations and risks of military training and service be shared
by all’.45 Given this framing, the more autonomy for draft administrators
the better.
Clark’s advocacy for the draft and against compulsory flag salutes in the
spring of 1940 exemplified the legal and ideological challenge that the Second
World War posed to its liberal belligerents. On the one hand, they were
fighting a war for liberty, and as such needed to uphold and even extend their
commitment to the personal freedoms that totalitarian regimes distinctively
43 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske Stone (27 May 1940), 4, Container 65,
Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress.
44 A Bill to Protect the Integrity and Institutions of the United States Through a System
of Selective Compulsory Military Training and Service, S. 4164 (20 June 1940), 12, Series
IXA, Box 8, GCP.
45 Ibid., 1.
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opposed. On the other hand, to contend with totalitarian mobilization, these
nations would have to expand their administrative capacity, further eroding
traditional notions of individual rights against state interference. Conscien-
tious objectors stood at the intersection of these two wartime trajectories;
it would largely fall to draft administrators to resolve the contradictions of a
total yet ostensibly libertarian war.
Conscription and conscientious objection in
the Second World War
The interwar debate over administrative governance had been structured by
an overly-simplistic contrast between classical liberal and totalitarian
approaches to the rule of law. Yet, as the war years would demonstrate in
terrifying detail, this distinction captured a real truth. Whereas the states that
fought the First World War had been broadly convergent in their legal
systems, they drifted further and further far apart during the interwar years.
When it came to the recognition of individual rights and other legal con-
straints on executive decision-making, the conduct of the totalitarian nations
departed markedly from both their more liberal counterparts and their
own predecessor regimes. Yet the conduct of the ‘liberal’ nations also
differed from the classical liberal ideals that so much anti-totalitarian rhetoric
invoked. As the war made clear, the outcome of the interwar debate over
administration in the Anglo-American world had been a hybrid form of
governance that sought a middle path between classical liberalism and
totalitarianism. It was this new administered liberalism that would contend
with the forces of fascism during the Second World War and – shortly after
the war’s end – Soviet communism.
The treatment of conscientious objectors during the Second World War
reflected this complex legal landscape. While there were significant continu-
ities with the First World War when it came to which countries afforded
formal recognition of the individual conscience, the actual experiences of
conscientious objectors depended upon their nations’ changing attitudes
toward state power. Imperial Germany, for instance, had offered few if any
formal protections during the First World War. Yet state authorities had not
been absolutist in their treatment of pacifists. As discussed above, military
officers frequently assigned such men to the medical corps, and those who
refused or did not receive this offer of alternative service were usually sent
to psychiatric hospitals, not prisons. With Hitler’s rise to power, however,
Germany became a regime of total mobilization, in which a collective notion
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of civic identity went hand-in-hand with unfettered administrative authority.
This legal and ideological transformation pervaded the military, eroding
informal mores that had once created space, however narrow, for pacifist
dissent.
By the time Germany reinstituted conscription in 1935, Hitler had already
arrested many of the leaders of the interwar peace movement.46 The
1935 draft law made no provision for conscientious objectors, and those
who refused to serve altogether or sought non-combatant duty generally
found themselves before a military court.47 Military judges could offer
defendants non-combatant duty in lieu of a conviction for disobedience,
but they rarely did so, and a few Protestant sectarians who specifically
requested medical duty during the war were executed. Scholars know of at
least 280 trials of objectors, the majority of which involved Jehovah’s
Witnesses.48 Before the outbreak of war, conviction for refusal to perform
military service – whether combatant or non-combatant – meant a prison
sentence, often followed by confinement in a concentration camp. Beginning
in September 1939, however, execution became the norm.49
If anything, the Soviet Union was even more oppressive than Germany
when it came to the treatment of pacifists during the Second World War.
Yet the Revolution itself had not assured this outcome. As in other areas of
Russian law, including the law of divorce and abortion, the early years of the
Bolshevik regime witnessed significant liberalization in conscientious objec-
tion policy. In 1918, when Lenin reinstituted conscription, he reached a deal
with Vladimir Chertkov, the leader of the Tolstoyans and founder of the
United Council of Religious Communities (UCRC).50 Codified in a January
1919 decree, the deal provided for alternative civilian service or unconditional
exemptions for anyone with sincere religious objections to war.51 The decree
also authorized Chertkov’s UCRC to ‘offer expert testimony on the applica-
tions of conscientious objectors before people’s courts’, which would then
select the appropriate form of accommodation.52 Although ‘extremely liberal’
in form, this system was undermined from the start by ‘militant atheists in
46 Brock, ‘Conscientious Objectors in Nazi Germany’, p. 370.
47 Ibid., pp. 371–5.
48 Karsten Bredemeier, Kriegsdienstverweigerung im Dritten Reich (Baden-Baden: Nomos,
1991).
49 Brock, Against the Draft, p. 427.
50 Ibid., p. 329.
51 Paul D. Steeves, ed., The Modern Encyclopedia of Religions in Russia and the Soviet Union
(Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1993), vol. V, pp. 223–5.
52 Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation, p. 193.
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the Commissariat of Justice’, and by provincial officials during the Civil War,
who frequently shot religious pacifists in contravention of superior orders.53
The end of the Civil War halted these executions, but by 1923 the Commis-
sariat of Justice had severely restricted the possible grounds of objection, and
by 1929 only the long-recognized Mennonites could rely on accommodation.
Even this carve-out for Mennonites was eliminated in 1935; imprisonment
or forced labour was a pacifist’s likely fate. By the time war broke out, ‘most
pacifists were either dead or dispersed and forced into silence’.54 While
details are sketchy, it appears that the few pacifists who continued to resist
military service during the Second World War died by firing squad.55
Like the totalitarian powers to its west, Imperial Japan had no provision
for conscientious objection in its draft law. Yet it also had few conscientious
objectors. An upper-class strain of Japanese pacifism influenced by Tolstoyan
and Quaker ideas generally did not advocate for conscientious objection
at all, recommending a sacrificial death on the battlefield.56 Those pacifists
who more actively resisted the wartime state generally came from poorer
backgrounds, and were affiliated with millenarian sects such as the Jehovah’s
Witnesses.57 Authorities suppressed these groups after 1928, and many were
imprisoned during the war.
France was the outlier in being a liberal democratic belligerent without
formal protections for conscientious objection.58 Like Russia, though for
quite different reasons, the Third Republic had briefly flirted with liberaliza-
tion but then retreated. Confronted with the horrors of the First World War,
France had seen a surge of interest in conscientious objection in the 1920s:
the Committee for the Defence of Conscientious Objection formed in 1920,
followed by the League for Legal Recognition of Conscientious Objection in
53 Brock, Against the Draft, p. 330.
54 Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation, p. 199.
55 William Edgerton, Memoirs of Peasant Tolstoyans in Soviet Russia (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1993), pp. 106–7.
56 Brock, Against the Draft, pp. 190–1.
57 Cyril Powles, ‘Pacifism in Japan, 1918–1945’, in Brock and Socknat, eds., Challenge to
Mars, pp. 427–39 (pp. 435–6).
58 Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway all had conscientious objector provisions on
the books during the Second World War, though conscription was suspended in the
Netherlands and Norway during the war, so conscientious objection was not an issue
in these countries. Neutral Denmark maintained a system of conscientious objection
throughout the period of German occupation, carrying forward the system it had first
implemented in 1917. See Nils Petter Gleditsch and Nils Ivar Agøy, ‘Norway: Toward
Full Freedom of Choice?’, in Moskos and Chambers, eds., The New Conscientious
Objection, pp. 114–26 (pp. 114–15); Sørensen, ‘Denmark’, p. 108; van de Vijver, ‘Appendix
E: The Netherlands’, p. 221.
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1924.59 In the early 1930s, however, the Ministries of War and the Interior
took pains to clamp down on pro-conscientious objection propaganda,
enlisting religious leaders to associate it with communism.60 These efforts
were largely successful. In 1931, a lone proposal to legalize conscientious
objection was introduced in the National Assembly, but it went nowhere,
and in 1934 the government actually dissolved the League for Legal Recogni-
tion.61 Prior to the fall of France, the French military prosecuted and
imprisoned those men who refused to serve; conscription was suspended
under the Vichy regime. In the wake of the Second World War, a coalition of
socialists, communists, Christian Democrats and Protestant ministers sought
a legislative amnesty for pacifists imprisoned during the war. The Senate
defeated their bill in 1953, however, and it would be another decade before
France legalized conscientious objection.
With Russia, Germany and Japan all narrowing earlier protections for
pacifists, and France maintaining its First World War policies, it is a striking
fact that the other liberal democratic belligerents – all English-speaking –
expanded their recognition of conscientious objection during the Second
World War. In the USA, which instituted peacetime conscription for the
first time in 1940, the draft was itself billed as a civil libertarian institution, a
shield against totalitarian threats to individual freedom. The initial peacetime
draft bill was written by a prominent civil libertarian, Grenville Clark, and
he enlisted the help of another civil libertarian hero, Judge William Clark,
in urging Congress to pass it. Two years earlier, Judge Clark had issued a
landmark ruling striking down municipal restrictions on labour rallies62 and,
drawing on this pedigree, Judge Clark assured the House Military Affairs
Committee that there was nothing totalitarian about conscription:
There are worse things than laying down that life in the cause of freedom
and justice . . . [W]e see no analogy between selective compulsory military
service and totalitarianism or any other ‘ism.’ Such an argument might be
as logically applied to taxation. Our government must be defended as it is
supported – by all of its citizens.63
59 Martin, ‘France: A Statute but No Objectors’, pp. 83–4.
60 Norman Ingram, ‘The Circulaire Chautemps, 1933: The Third Republic Discovers
Conscientious Objection’, French Historical Studies 17 (1991), 387–409.
61 Flynn, Conscription and Democracy, p. 201.
62 Hague v. CIO, 25 F.Supp. 127 (D.NJ 1938), aff’d 307 US 496 (1939). Hague was the first
case in which Grenville Clark’s Special Committee on the Bill of Rights participated.
63 House Military Affairs Committee, Selective Compulsory Military Training and Service,
Hearings Before the House Committee on Military Affairs, H.R. 10132 (1940), 20.
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Most other civil libertarians and peace activists agreed with – or didn’t think
it worth resisting – the Clarks’ egalitarian and libertarian arguments for the
draft. Instead, these activists focused their energies on expanding accommo-
dations for conscientious objectors. In the summer of 1940, the American
Civil Liberties Union worked with the American Friends Service Committee
(AFSC), a Quaker group, to lobby for a bill more respectful of draftees’ civil
liberties.64 Three major changes emerged from their efforts. First, the defin-
ition of legitimate conscientious objector was expanded from official member
of a pacifist religious sect to any person who objected to all wars on the
basis of his ‘religious training and belief’. Second, designated conscientious
objectors would have a choice of non-combatant service in the military
or alternative service under civilian command. Finally, the Department of
Justice, not local draft boards, would determine in the first instance who was
a legitimate conscientious objector.
The third change was probably the most radical, as it removed the initial
determination of conscientious objector status both from local control and
from the federal agency whose primary responsibility was furnishing suffi-
cient manpower for the war effort (the Selective Service System). As we will
see, English advocates had also sought to centralize decision-making about
conscientious objection and to insulate such decision-making from general
manpower planning. The move against local control is particularly striking as
it was odds with a contemporaneous critique of administrative governance
that associated centralization with the suppression of civil liberty. When
it came to protecting unpopular and marginal groups, advocates were quite
certain that national bureaucrats were preferable to local dignitaries.
The Department of Justice itself, however, blanched at the enormous
increase in workload that conscientious objector determinations would
entail.65 If later intra-departmental debates are any indication, the Depart-
ment was also likely concerned that the taking on of such a seemingly
adjudicative task by a prosecutorial body would itself threaten the separation
of powers.66 In the end, Quaker lobbyists convinced the bill’s conference
committee to endorse a compromise whereby local draft boards would make
64 E. Raymond Wilson, ‘Evolution of the Conscientious Objector Provisions in the
1940 Conscription Bill’, Quaker History 64 (Spring 1975), 3–15 (p. 7).
65 J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., The First Peacetime Draft (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 221–3 Wilson, ‘Evolution of the Conscientious
Objector Provisions’, p. 10.
66 See, for example, Assistant to the Attorney General Matthew McGuire to Attorney
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the initial determinations of whether an individual qualified as a conscien-
tious objector and, if so, what kind of alternative service he should perform –
non-combatant duty in the military or work under civilian command. If the
man appealed this initial classification, however, the Department of Justice
would review his file and make a recommendation to the relevant appeals
board. A final appeal could be made to the Presidential Appeals Board.67
Throughout the back-room negotiations over administrative responsibility
for determination of conscientious objector status, there was never any
disagreement that the conclusions reached by the administrative process
would be final. Many of the civil libertarians who composed and supported
the draft law – civil libertarians such as Grenville Clark and William Clark –
had fought, and would continue to fight, for expanded judicial review of
administrative decision-making in other contexts, especially when civil liber-
tarian rights were at stake. But, in their eyes, the draft law’s administrative
resolution of conscience claims served another kind of civil libertarian end –
the defeat of totalitarianism. This administrative approach to the problem of
conscientious objection was the norm across the English-speaking world,
though the types of accommodation provided and the variety of procedural
protections afforded to would-be objectors differed from country to country.
British political and military leaders had been reluctant to bring back
conscription at all, given the bloody cost of the First World War. In the
wake of Hitler’s 1933 rise to power, the military focused on strengthening air
defence, a strategic vision that aligned with the government’s fiscal concerns.
Both the Americans and the French, however, pleaded with the British
leadership to reinstitute conscription and commit to continental defence.
Eventually, the Chamberlain government did so – in response to Hitler’s
April 1939 abrogation of the Munich accords. British anti-war groups were
more critical of the move to conscription than their American counterparts
would be in 1940, but the government dampened criticism by adopting a
highly accommodating stance toward conscientious objectors.68
Such an accommodating approach was uncontroversial, motivated
by a pervasive sense that the local military service tribunals had failed to
adequately protect conscience in the last war.69 Three First World War
conscientious objectors served in the wartime government, and Lord
67 Julien Cornell, The Conscientious Objector and the Law (New York: John Day, 1944),
pp. 25–6.
68 Flynn, Conscription and Democracy, p. 194.
69 Cain, ‘Conscientious Objection’, pp. 288–99.
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Beveridge, Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill all spoke publicly
in support of the lenient treatment of conscientious objectors. In 1940, for
instance, Beveridge told an audience of radio listeners that ‘admission of the
right of conscientious objection to serve in war is the extreme case of British
freedom. Nor have I any doubt that it makes Britain stronger in war rather
than weaker.’70
In the First World War, general military service tribunals had heard
conscientious objector claims alongside a host of other requests for defer-
ment or exemption. But the National Service (Armed Forces) Act of
1939 established a semi-autonomous system of ‘Conscientious Objectors’
Tribunals’ to be administered by the Minister of Labour and National
Service.71 Under this system, any man required to register by the Act could
ask to be provisionally included on the register of conscientious objectors,
indicating whether he sought a total exemption, non-combatant duty in the
military, or alternative civilian work. One of nineteen Local Conscientious
Objector Tribunals would then consider the application. Either the applicant
or the Minister of Labour could appeal a local decision to one of six Appellate
Tribunals. The Appellate Tribunal’s decision was final, and the 1939 Act
explicitly provided that ‘no determination of a local tribunal or the Appellate
Tribunal . . . can be called into question in any court of law.’72
In many respects the British law was more accommodating than the
American. First and foremost, it created an entire administrative apparatus
devoted to the consideration of claims of conscience, an apparatus at least
formally walled off from the general manpower concerns faced by the local
military service tribunals. Second, it offered the possibility of an uncondi-
tional exemption from all forms of wartime service, though less than 5 per
cent of conscientious objectors actually received this status.73 Third, the
British civilian service option involved far less coercion than the American
version. In Britain, conscientious objectors offered alternative civilian service
were simply directed to seek employment in a relatively undermanned
industry – agriculture or forestry, for instance. In the USA, on the other
hand, the main non-military service was confinement in Civilian Public
70 Quoted in Denis Hayes, Challenge of Conscience: The Story of the Conscientious Objectors,
1939–1949 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949), p. 6.
71 Rachel Barker, Conscience, Government, and War: Conscientious Objection in Great Britain,
1939–1945 (London: Routledge, 1982), p. 12.
72 Pollard, ‘Conscientious Objectors’, p. 74.
73 Roger Broad, Conscription in Britain, 1939–1964: The Militarisation of a Generation
(London: Routledge, 2006), p. 188.
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Service Camps, administered by the Selective Service System in conjunc-
tion with the non-governmental National Service Board of Religious
Objectors. These camps were often de facto, if not de jure, under military
command. Fourth, the law designated that the chairmen of local tribunals
should be judicial officers – county court judges or sheriffs. While these
tribunals were administrative bodies, not common law courts, it was
thought that the participation of judicial officers would nonetheless lead
to fairer treatment of objectors. In the USA, there was no such effort to
judicialize the administration of the draft boards. Fifth and finally, the
British law recognized both religious and secular beliefs as legitimate
grounds for conscientious objection, while the American statute required
that the would-be conscientious objector demonstrate ‘religious training
and belief’.74 On the other hand, American administrators often waived this
requirement in practice.
The American system did offer would-be conscientious objectors two
major advantages over the British system – an additional layer of adminis-
trative appeal and a more centralized process of administrative oversight.
First, the existence of a single Presidential Appeals Board, overseen by the
Director of Selective Service himself, gave individuals a third shot at
receiving some form of accommodation. Second, both the Selective Service
Director’s responsibility for this final appellate body and the statutorily
mandated involvement of the Department of Justice in advising on conscien-
tious objector claims meant that objector advocates could focus their lobby-
ing on a single group of officials in Washington, DC. This group of officials
tended to be much more sympathetic to alleged conscientious objectors than
the volunteers who staffed the local draft boards; this group also possessed
the power to overrule those boards’ decisions.75 In Britain, in contrast,
conscientious objector advocates continually complained about the decen-
tralized decision-making of the Local and Appellate Tribunals, and called in
vain on the Ministry of Labour and National Service to step in to normalize
the process.76 Accordingly, while official and academic histories of the US
74 Selective Training and Service Act, 54 Stat. 885 (1940).
75 Mulford Sibley and Philip Jacob, Conscription of Conscience: The American State and the
Conscientious Objector, 1940–1947 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 71–81.
76 Barker, Conscience, Government, and War, pp. 16–17, Flynn, Conscription and Democracy,
pp. 195, 200; Cain, ‘Conscientious Objection’, p. 292; Robert S. W. Pollard, ‘Tribunals
for Conscientious Objectors’, in Robert S. W. Pollard, ed., Administrative Tribunals at
Work (London: Stevens & Sons, 1950), p. 8.
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Selective Service System tend to trumpet its ‘Jeffersonian’ structure – a fair
amount of decision-making being left in the hands of local volunteers – the
US system was in fact highly centralized when it came to the administration
of conscientious objectors.
By war’s end, the USA had inducted 10 million men and heard about
75,000 claims of conscientious objection, assigning 25,000 conscientious
objectors to non-combatant service in the military, and 12,000 to work in
Civilian Public Service camps.77 Another 12,000 men were initially assigned
non-combatant or alternative service status on conscientious grounds, but
were later reclassified (either because they withdrew their objections, or
were deferred on other grounds, such as an occupational or dependency
deferment). About 20,000 applications were rejected. Britain inducted about
8 million men and women through military and labour drafts, and con-
sidered approximately 60,000 claims of conscientious objection, 1,000 from
women.78 About 20,000 conscientious objectors served in a civilian capacity,
15,000 performed non-combatant duty in the military, and 3,000 received
unconditional exemptions. A third of all applications were rejected
The Canadian system of conscientious objection was less accommodating
than either the British or the American. The initial National Resources
Mobilization Act of June 1940 and its attendant regulations offered conscien-
tious objection only to members of pacifist religious sects.79 Members of a
few sects – such as the Dukhobors and Kanadier Mennonites – were entitled
to an absolute exemption, while the rest would have to perform some
form of alternative service. Over the first two years of the draft, authorities
eliminated the absolute exemptions, while gradually expanding the acceptable
grounds of objection, first to sincere pacifists of any religious denomination,
and then to any sincere pacifist who based his objections on some religious
training and belief – the American baseline. Uniquely in the Anglo-American
world, Canadian law provided no appeal – not even an administrative appeal –
from these Boards’ decisions.80 These decisions were absolutely final, and
could not be attacked in any court – even by a writ of habeas corpus. By
77 Flynn, Conscription and Democracy, pp. 191–2; Nicholas A. Krehbiel, General Lewis
B. Hershey and ConscientiousObjection during WorldWar II (Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 2011), p. 145.
78 Barker, Conscience, Government and War, Appendix 3; Broad, Conscription in Britain,
p. 188; Flynn, Conscription and Democracy, pp. 167, 196.
79 Thomas P. Socknat, ‘Conscientious Objection in Canada’, in Brock and Socknat, eds.,
Challenge to Mars, pp. 256–71.
80 Pollard, ‘Conscientious Objectors’, p. 77.
jeremy k. kessler
470
Comp. by: MANJULA G Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 16 Title Name: GEYERandTOOZE
Date:2/2/15 Time:15:02:01 Page Number: 471
December 1945, about 10,000 Canadian men had received conscientious
objector status.81
In a 1943 report, New Zealand’s National Service Department bemoaned
the problem of conscientious objection: ‘Though comparatively few in
number, conscientious objectors have proved to be by far the most difficult
section of the population to deal with in the matter of national service.’82
Of about 300,000 men that New Zealand mobilized for war, 5,000 sought
conscientious objector status.83 About 2,000 were deferred on other grounds,
about 1,800 were assigned to non-combatant duty or work of national
importance, and about 1,200 appeals were rejected outright. The task of
identifying genuine objectors fell to six Armed Service Appeals Boards
established to hear the full range of deferment and exemption claims. These
Boards operated under the authority of the Director of National Service,
and only the Director could reopen cases to introduce new evidence, such
as evidence of fraud. Otherwise, the Boards’ decisions were final, and no
administrative appeals process existed. Those objectors assigned to ‘work of
national importance’ were supervised by an additional ‘Special Tribunal’
with the power to compel evidence, conduct inquiries, and issue orders to
ensure that a conscientious objector’s salary never exceeded that of a sol-
dier’s. This Special Tribunal was closed to the public and its decisions could
also not be appealed. As Robert Pollard remarked a year after the end of
the war: ‘The Special Tribunal has an advantage from the Government’s
point of view because there is no right of appeal from its decisions and yet it
appears to be a judicial body.’84
As in the First World War, Australia proved the exception to the Anglo-
American rule of administrative adjudication of conscientious objector
claims. By 1941, any registrant could apply to a local court of summary
jurisdiction, seeking either non-combatant duty or alternative civilian service
on grounds of his ‘conscientious beliefs’.85 And, beginning in 1939, the
Australian government expanded the First World War definition of
81 John A. Toews, Alternative Service in Canada during World War II (Canadian Conference
of the Mennonite Brethren Church, 1959), p. 61.
82 Quoted in Pollard, ‘Conscientious Objectors’, p. 81.
83 J. E. Cookson, ‘Pacifism and Conscientious Objection in New Zealand’, in Brock and
Socknat eds., Challenge to Mars, pp. 292–311.
84 Pollard, ‘Conscientious Objectors’, p. 81.
85 Ibid., p. 75; Peter Brock and Malcolm Saunders, ‘Pacifists as Conscientious Objectors in
Australia’, in Brock and Socknat, eds., Challenge to Mars, pp. 272–91; Smith, ‘Con-
science, State, and the Law’.
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‘conscientious beliefs’ to cover both religious and secular objections,
mirroring British practice. Either the government or the applicant could
appeal a decision of the local court to a court of full jurisdiction in the same
territory or commonwealth, and this judicial check seems to have largely
satisfied pacifist observers of the draft process. Of the approximately 2,700
conscientious objector applications considered during the war, about 1,000
men were assigned to non-combatant duty in the military, another 1,000 to
alternative civilian service, and about 600 were rejected.86 Forty men
received unconditional exemptions and sixty applications were still pending
at war’s end. In contrast to New Zealand, which assigned nearly 600 would-
be conscientious objectors to detention camps, it appears that fewer
than 200 Australian pacifists were imprisoned.87 Similarly, Australia
rejected just over 20 per cent of conscientious objector applications, while
New Zealand rejected 40 per cent. These rejection rates were the outliers
in the Anglo-American world, with British and American rates clustered in
the middle.
Conclusion
This survey of conscientious objector policies during the Second World
War shows both a diversity of approaches within the Anglo-American world
and a stark divergence between the Anglo-American powers and their
more statist and collectivist enemies and allies. As in the First World War,
two long-running factors help explain the divergence: relative strategic
isolation and a legal tradition of individual rights protection. Yet interwar
strategic and legal developments had dampened the significance of both of
these factors. Advances in air and naval power and the emergence of an
enormous Pacific theatre threw into question the free security once enjoyed
by island nations. At the same time, economic and political upheaval during
the interwar period had eroded the traditional practices of individual rights
protection. By the early years of the Second World War, the Anglo-American
belligerents had parted ways with the rigid enforcement of property and
86 Brock and Saunders, ‘Pacifists as Conscientious Objectors in Australia’, pp. 284, 290
n. 41.
87 Compare ibid., p. 284 with Cookson, ‘Pacifism and Conscientious Objection in New
Zealand’, p. 301. The number of conscientious objection claims actually adjudicated by
authorities was about the same in the two nations.
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contract rights, and had consigned whole areas of individual rights protection
to powerful and pervasive administrative agencies shielded from judicial
review.
Given these strategic and legal transformations, it is all the more striking
that the Anglo-American nations actually strengthened their protections for
conscientious objectors during the Second World War. They were indeed
fighting a war for liberty, and their treatment of conscientious objectors
reflected this ideological critique of totalitarian power as a threat to individ-
ual expression and identity. Yet to secure liberty of conscience, Anglo-
American nations used the tools of administrative governance that many
considered to be a major domestic threat to liberty, even a capitulation
to totalitarian rule. There is a striking parallel here with the trajectory of
Anglo-American economic governance, in which the 1930s and 1940s saw an
unprecedented expansion of state intervention in the interest of securing the
market economy.
One takeaway from these wartime experiments might have been that
there was in fact no fundamental tension between administrative governance
and individual liberty. Some English and American appraisals of wartime
and post-war administrative governance made just this point, citing the
treatment of conscientious objectors as one example among many of the
synthesis of efficiency, expertise and rights protection that administrative
decision-making had provided.88 Indeed, one could say that the adminis-
trative resolution of conscience claims helped to defeat the totalitarian
enemy in two senses: first, by maintaining an efficient system of manpower
management uninterrupted by slow and inexpert judicial review; second,
by incorporating an anti-totalitarian norm of freedom of conscience within
the draft apparatus.
Yet this was not the lesson that the Anglo-American and European legal
communities generally took from the war. Rather, they gradually accepted
the identification of totalitarian misrule with administrative autonomy,
and imposed new judicial checks on administrative decision-making.89 Some
88 See, for example, United States v. Estep, 327 US 114, 137 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); Pollard, ‘Tribunals for Conscientious Objectors’, p. 9; note, ‘Restrictions on
Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies Exercising Emergency Powers – Duty to
Obey Orders Prior to Determination of Invalidity’, Yale Law Journal 56 (1947), 403, 407.
89 Lindseth, ‘The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy’, pp. 1385–415; Reuel Schiller,
‘Reining in the Administrative State: World War II and the Decline of Expert Adminis-
tration’, in Daniel Ernst and Victor Jew, eds., Total War and the Law: The American
Home Front in World War II (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), pp. 185–206 (p. 200).
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of the earliest instances of this new vogue for the judicial enforcement
of individual rights would occur in the draft law context.90 In this regard,
the ‘civilianization’91 of Western militaries and the judicialization of their
administrative states would go hand-in-hand, twinned features of a new war
for liberty – a Cold War increasingly defined by American commitments to
nuclear superiority and lightly regulated markets.
90 See, for example, Dickinson v. United States, 346 US 389 (1953); Jürgen Kuhlmann and
Ekkehard Lippert, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany: Conscientious Objection as
Social Welfare’, in Moskos and Chambers, eds., The New Conscientious Objection,
pp. 98–105.
91 Jacques van Doorn, The Soldier and Social Change (London: Sage, 1975); James J.
Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe (New
York: Houghton Mifflin, 2008).
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